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Summary findings
Using an integrated simulation model, McCarthy and  Reai income growth is needed to cope with poverty
Zheng estimate the scope and speed of population-aging  among the elderly, especially in developing countries. To
in China, the cost of supporting the old, and the impact  establish an adequate, efficient, and equitable social
of different reform options and pension arrangements.  security system, China must maintain long-term
Among their conclusions:  socioeconomic stability and sustainable growth.
The scope and speed of popuiation-aging  in China  China could improve the labor market by removing
make the present pension system financially  management rigidities, facilitating human resource
unsustainable, even assuming that GDP grows steadilv in  development,  making labor markets more competitive,
the long term. Moving the retirement age back would  improving the household registration system, improving
provide a temporary  fix for the current pay-as-you-go  incentives, and rewarding hard and innovative work. To
pension system but would be politicallv viable only  reduce unemployment, China can create more job
where there is great demand for labor.  oppor-tunities in nontraditional  sectors, especially its
Pension funds could be made more sustainable by  underdeveloped  service industries. To shift jobs to the
increasing GDP growth, raising contribution  rates, or  nonagricultural sector, it can develop medium-size cities.
gradually reducing benefit rates. Blut  the financial costs  And to cushion the impact of demographic shocks, China
and social obstacles of those refornm  options must be  should preserve traditional values and maintain family-
carefully assessed. Ftully  funded, privately managed  community support.
pension schemes might be feasible, but require a sound  Drawing onI  experience in Europe and Latin America,
regulatory framework and institutional infrastructure,  China should move toward a transparent  and
including financial markets that provido adequate siavings  decentralized system with (1) a fully funded, portable,
instruments and insurance opt'Ols.  defined-benefit pension plan, designed to meet basic
Pension reform is a long term, niuitidimensional  needs, and (2) occupational pension plans or personal
problem involving economilic,  social, political, and  savings accounirs  to satisfy demand for maintaining or
Cultural  factors. Governments  should not focus only on  improving living standards.
taxes and transfers to redistribute incone to and among
the elderly.
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1.  Introduction
While being proud of its civilization as one of the world's oldest, China, though
relatively youthful at present, is getting older rapidly and massively. Strict family planning
practice has sharply reduced fertility since early 1980s. Better living conditions and
medical services have cut down mortality and extended life expectancy in both urban and
rural areas.  Consequently, the percentage of older persons in the total population
increases continuously, and the median age of the population rises steadily. Moreover, the
aging process is expected to accelerate in the coming decades as the baby boomers born
between early 60s and mid-70s, currently numbering more than 250 million  (twice Japan's
present total population), approach retirement age around 2030. By then as many as 22
percent of Chinese nationals will be more than 60 years old, jumping from 9.7 percent in
1995.  During the same period, the ratio of working-age persons to the aged is estimated
to be halved from 9.7:1 to 4.2:1.  Without a properly designed social security system and
strategically formulated policy responses, it would be very difficult  for China  to cope with
this coming old-age challenge.
The pressure generated from these demographic dynamics for China in the 2030s
share some similarities  with those facing Western developed countries and Japan in the
next decade.  However, China is a low-income country, with per capita income of US$
490 in 1993 being less than 2 percent of that in the United States at the current market
exchange rate, or close to 10 percent when measured at purchasing power parity'.
Apparently, China's quick population aging process and lower level of development mean
that income resources available to support non-productive aged people will be far less
I  The World  Bank's World  Development  Report 1995  , page  220, presents  a cross  country
comparison  of PPP estimates  of GNP. Here China's per capita GNP  in 1993  is estimated  at US2,330  as
compared  with  that of India at US$1,220.
1than in the developed world.  Even with the Confucian tradition of filial  piety and respect
for the elderly, China with relatively fewer young will soon find itself in difficulties  to
provide adequate support to its rapidly increasing old-age population.
Faced by these serious challenges for harmonizing economic growth with social
sustainability, the Chinese  government has begun to take measures to reform its currently
fragmented social security system. Policy options on pension system reforms have been
studied, and several experiments for social security decentralization have been carried out
at provincial and municipal  levels. State and collective enterprises began pooling pension
funds in order to ease uneven burden of retirement costs.  However,  many long-term
strategic issues on the interdependence between demographic transition and economic
growth remain to be systematically  investigated.  For instance, what is the real financial
burden the population aging process creates, given the fact that both the income growth
rate and the average private savings rate in China rank among the world's highest in recent
years and will probably continue to be so in the near future?  What are the macroeconomic
implications if the current pay-as-as-go type of pension scheme were not reformed? How
to deal with the insolvency  of pension funds associated with state-owned enterprises?
What roles shall individual  workers, enterprises, and different levels of governments play
to establish sufficient, efficient,  and equitable social security systems? How can pension
funds be most effectively  managed, privately or publicly? How are different schemes
socially and financially  sustainable?  What are the political implications associated with
pension system reforms since any adjustments on this front will inevitably  necessitate inter-
generational transfers and intra-generational redistribution among different income
groups?  How much can China learn from experiences of both developed and developing
countries?
This paper seeks to make a contribution to policy thinking on these important
questions.  The theme of the paper is that issues around the old-age social security system
in most developing countries, such as China, need to be addressed in a broader
macroeconomic sense rather than over-stressing on design and management of the pension
2funds pe se.  The ultimate means to endure and improve living standards for the old
population is to maintain long-term stability and promote sustainable income growth,
while reforming micro-incentive  structure to encourage private savings. Workers,
pensioners, enterprises, and different levels of governments need to cooperate to improve
labor productivity, create new job opportunities, preserve traditional and family  values,
liberalize and develop financial markets, and rationalize government interventions in the
social security system.
There exist extensive discussions, as cited in World Bank (1994), on pension
schemes and social security systems. However, only a few are directly concerned with
policy applications in China 2. Using a simple simulation model similar to that of Schieber
and Shoven (1994) and the World Bank's  population forecasting for China (World Bank
1995), this paper attempts to quantitatively illustrate: (a) the scope and the speed of
population aging and its associated cost of supporting the old in the future, (b) whether a
typical pay-as-you-go system is sustainable and how large the cost if no reforms were
conducted, and (c) system sensitivities  with respect to alternative policy choices.
Although other kinds of benefits and compensations, such as health insurance and
disability  benefits, are integral parts of the social security system, the focus here is
maintained on pensions for retired persons.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II analyzes major
challenges China will face during its demographic and socio-economic transition.  Section
Im presents a simple model built around a pay-as-you-go system which integrates demand
for old age supports with supply of funds available from workers' contribution. Section
IV focuses on the sustainability  sensitivities of  different policy alternatives. Section V
concludes this paper with some remarks and suggests directions for further policy studies.
2  A partial  list  of studies  on  pension  system  reform  in China  includes  Ahmad  and  Hussian  (1991),
Barkan  (1990),  Dixion  and  Macarov  (1992),  Hu (1994),  Hussain  (1993,1994),  Hussian  and  Li (1989),
Lee  (1993),  Tian  (1995),  World  Bank  (1990,  1994),  and Yue  (1985).
311.  Challenges  Ahead
Living on about 7 percent of the arable land of the earth, China's population of 1.2
billion accounts for about 21 percent of the world's  total and surpasses that of India, the
second largest in the world, by more than 30 percent.  Significant socio-economic
progresses, as shown by the indicators in Table I in terms of both development dynamics
and international comparison, have been made in the past decades.  These achievements
are especially apparent within the past 15 years, when market reforms and integration into
the world trade and finance systems resulted in noticeable improvement in production
efficiency and income growth.  Within the period between 1980 and 1994, real GDP grew
at a rate close to 10 percent per annum on average, the number of persons living in
absolute poverty was halved, and the international trade volume rose by five to six times
to more than US$200 billion. This remarkable growth was largely financed by domestic
savings, although foreign financial assistance through investment and lending also played
an important role.  As exemplified in the 1992 Development Diamond presented in Figure -
1, China compares favorably with most low-income economies in all four dimensions.
While fundamental transformation and economic growth will probably continue at
a fast pace in the first decades of the twenty first century, a number of concerns for long
term sustainability are emerging.  The old-age security system is one of more pressing.
Out of many social, political, and economic factors that can generate significant  impact on
the social security system in the near future, the following four intertwined factors are
central for policy formation to avert a potential old age crisis:
(a) how to promote growth while preserving traditional values?
(b) how to adjust population policies to cope with the demographic development?
(c) how to divert labor force concentration from agriculture to industries and
services while maintaining rural-urban balances? and
(d) how to mitigate the social cost during the transition from a central planning
regime towards a competitive market economy?
4Table I
Basic Indicators of Social and Economic  Development
(1993 unless  otherwise  stated)
Other  Low-  Middle-
China  India  Income  Income  World
Economies"  Economies
Population  million  1178  898  1015  1597  5501
Urban  %  29  26  27  60  37
Growth  Rate (80-93)  %  1.4  2.0  2.5  1.7  L7
Total Fertility  Rate  2.0  3.7  5.5  3.0  3.2
Life Expectancy  years  69  61  56  68  66
Adult Illiteracy  %  27  52  49  17  33
Primary Net Enrollment  %  96  57
Access  to Safe  Water  %  71  75
GNP  per capita  USS  490  300  300  2480  4420
GDP Growth  Rate (80-93)  %  9.6  5.2  2.9  2.1  2.9
Avg. Inflation  Rate (80-93)  %  7.0  8.7  27.1  90.1  19.6
Exports  US$  bil.  91.7  21.5  43.2  648.2  3701.5
Growth  Rate (80-93)  %  11.5  7.0  1.4
Imports  US$  bil.  103.1  22.8  62.9  724.6  3778.7
As Share  of GNP
Gross  Domestic  Investment  %  41  24  17  23  22
Gross  Domestic  Savings  %  40  24  10  22  22
Agriculture  %  19  31  37
Industry  %  48  27  22
Service  %  33  41  42
Source:  World  Bank  (1995):  World  Development  Report  1995:  Workers  in  an Integrated  World
1/  excluding  China  and  India.
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Development Diamand: 1992
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For thousands  of years, traditional  values in China  have placed strong emphasis  on
the role of the family  as a unit of production and consumption  in general, and as a basis for
raising  the young and supporting  the old in particular. Three or four generations  usually  live
under the same  roof to pool resources and share risks. When grandparents  in ordinary  families
become too old to generate  income directly  from working outside,  they stay at home not only
to just rest but to take care of young grandchildren  and do housework in order to reduce
burdens of the rniddle  generation. This system worked quite  well, often in the absence  of any
formal market work arrangements. The virtues of diligence,  frugality  and thrift are glorified.
Accumulation  of social  experience  and financial  wealth, largely  bequest-motivated,  by the old
through their life-long  hard work wins them respect from the society. Thus the welfare  of
older members  has been an essential  responsibility  of families,  as a reward to the altruistic  spirit
of the older generation. This traditional natural harmony between generations  within  the family
and among members  of a community  is now being disrupted  as the economy  modernizes  and
opens to extemal  influences. The families  themselves are getting smaller,  especially  in urban
areas because of housing  problems. While a higher percentage  of family  members  are living
longer, traditional  extended  family  living  arrangements are being stressed  by the need for some
members to become more mobile  to respond to new economic  incentives. Understandably  in
an increasingly  secular  society more activities  are valued through market interactions,  and there
is often more emphasis  on self gratification  and less on commnunal  responsibilities.
In China,  significant  importance  needs to be attached  to preserving  the tradition of
respecting and supporting  the old on family  and community  basis. Currently, China's big
population is mostly rural with low income.  About  10 percent of the population are still
living in absolute poverty with an income less than half a dollar a day.  In addition, 27
percent of adults are illiterate. For persons 60 years or older, about one in ten women and
two in ten men can actually read and write.  Socialized old-age security systems through
operations of pension funds and insurance arrangements are unlikely to play a major role
until later in the next century, because of China's current development level of economy
7and infrastructure.  Nursery homes, if built to house China's 360 Million  old persons in the
2030s, would be very costly and labor-intensive, and may not necessarily provide better
services to the elderly than within a family atmosphere.  Hence, how to preserve and
promote traditional family  values shall be a key policy issue in designing old-age security
systems in China.
Demographic Transition and Population Policy
Another challenge  comes  from the inertia of  the demographic transition. China's
population, unevenly distributed across regions, is projected to grow at an average annual
rate of  less than 0.9 percent between 1995 and 2030.  This growth rate is only a half of
the 1.8 percent rate between 1970 and 1980 and substantially lower than 1.4 percent rate
between 1980 and 1993. But the size of the incremental population is enormous because
of the much larger population base.  Close to a net of 430 million  people will be added to
China's population within the next 35 years, which is equivalent to five times of the
current total population in Germany. More than half of this increase can be attributed to
extension of life expectancy,  which is forecast to advance from 69 years at birth  in 1995  to 75
years in 2030. By 2030, close to 30 percent of the world's incremental old-age population,
as compared with that in 1990, will be accumulated in China. The normal  population  aging
process seen in most countries  has been particularly  rapid in China during a long period of
steady growth, when overall  economic  conditions improve and access to better health  facilities
becomes wider. In France, 140 years elapsed before the proportion of the population over
60 doubled to  18 percent in 1976. It will take China just 34 years.  The old-age
dependency ratio will rise from 15 in 1995 to 38 in 2030, while the average age of the
population increases by 8.3 years from 29.4 in 1995 to 37.7 in 2030. Table 2 below
summarizes some trends of the demographic development in China. Figures 2 to 5 plot
some indicative demographic  trends of China based on the population projections of the
World Bank.
8Table  2
Basic Indicators of Demographic Development
Other  Low  Middle-
China  India  Income  Income  World
Economies  Economies
Annual Population  Growth
1970-1980  %  1.8  2.2  2.5  1.9  1.8
1980-1993  %  1.4  2.0  2.5  1.7  1.7
1993-2000  %  0.9  1.8  2.9  1.4  1.5
Labor Force: 1993
As% of total population  %  60.0  38.0  37.9
Participation  Rate  %  91.5  67.4  83.9
Engaged  in Agriculture  %  61.0  63.2
Infant Mortality  Rate
1970  0/00  69  137  135  74  1272
1993  0/oo  30  80  89  39  42
Total Fertility  Rate
1970  0/00  5.8  5.5  6.5  4.5  4.8
1993  0/00  2.0  3.7  5.5  3.0  3.2
2000  0/00  1.9  3.2  4.9  2.7  2.9
Crude  Birth Rate
1970  0/00  33  39  45  31  32
1993  0/00  19  29  40  23  25
AgeDependencyRatio:  1993  52  77  121  81  73
Urban Population  Growth
1970-1980  %  3.0  3.7  4.2  3.3  2.6
1980-1993  %  4.3  3.0  4.2  2.8  2.6
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China: Youth and Elderly Support  Ratio 1985-2150
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7.5  5.0  2.5  0.0  2.5  5.0  7.5  7.5  5.0  2.5  0.0  2.5  5.0  7.5This accelerated aging process has also been heavily influenced  by very aggressive
birth control policies. Especially the "one couple-one child" policy has been carried out
since the late 1970s in response to the baby boom from 1960s to early 1970s, and in order
to move rapidly to a balanced simple reproduction  level.  Admittedly,  this "one-child"
policy has been successful to reduce the number of the new born, as evidenced by a sharp
decline of the total fertility rate from 5.8 per woman in 1970 to 2.0 in 1993 and of the
crude birth rate from 33 in 1970 to  19 in 1993.  However, it creates irregular waves of
population cohorts and imposes pressures for frequent adjustments in education systems,
employment settlements, and pension systems for retirees.  In the worst case, when
persons born under the "one-child" policy reach the age of child-bearing,  they may enter
into a 1-2-4 structure, i.e., the middle-aged couple have to support their young child as
well as four old grandparents. Unfortunately, the population age structure may reflect
past irregularities for several generations before these echo effects disappear. Trade-offs
between short-term benefits and long-term costs have to be taken into consideration when
population policies are adjusted.
Structural Adjustment and Rural-Urban Balance
Rural-urban balance is another important aspect of the old-age security  system
evolution in China. As in most countries,  the share of the population  living  in urban areas
increases  during the course of industrial  development and economic  growth. Driven primarily
by youthful  migration  from the countryside  to big cities, urbanization  changes  socio-economic
profiles  of the work force as workers shift from predominantly  self-sufficient  agricultural
engagement  to highly  mobile  industrial  pursuits and services. Old persons, especially  old
women, in urban areas  usually  have relative disadvantages in competing  with better educated
and more flexible  younger  workers in income generation, and thus tend to have  a decreased
participation  in the labor  force and a greater need for support. After a fast growth rate of 3.0
percent per annum  during 1970s,  urban population in China  increased  at an accelerated  rate of
4.3 percent per annum  during the period from 1980 to 1993. This rate is more than three times
the overall national  population  growth rate of 1.4 percent in the same  period  and significantly
14higher than the corresponding  world average of 2.6 percent. Consequently,  the share of urban
population in the national  total rose sharply  from 17 percent in 1970 to 29 percent in 1993.
However, the current level  of urbanization  in China is still very low as compared  with that of
60 percent in middle-income  countries  and 78 percent in high-income  countries  in 1993.
Urbanization  stimulates  changes  in the family  structure and kinship  networks  with both
beneficial  and adverse  impact  for the well-being of the elderly. These changes  have particular
implications  for old age security  arrangements  in China. On one hand, young family  members
living in urban areas may  not be able to provide inmmediate  and direct care for their parents and
grandparents who may  remain in rural areas. The delivery  of  services  to the rural  elderly  is
often logistically  difficult  and costly  when socialized  institutions  and the basic  infrastructure  are
not yet in place. On the other  hand, the younger generation in urban areas  with better  job
opportunities may  have enhanced  financial  capacities to support their parents and can afford  to
pay for higher quality  services,  such as old age health care. Given China's current low level of
urbanization,  one approach  to addressing  this rural-urban balance  might  be to use economic
incentives  to reduce population  concentration  in large cities  with a population  more  than one
million  but develop small  and medium  cities with a population  between 100  to 500 thousands.
The elderly  can thus live  together with or within a short distance from the younger  members  of
the family. Policy  efforts have  to be formnulated  well in advance since  the magnitude  and the
speed will be unprecedented in history: To absorb a half  of about 400 million  incremental
population between 1995 and 2030 and reach an urbanization  level of 35 percent, China  needs
to build up around 1,000  cities  with an average size of 200,000 persons within  just 35 years!
Sustainability of Socio-economic Transition
Bottlenecks  for establishing  a well-functioning  old age security  system  in China  can
also present themselves  in terms of social and political sustainability  of economic
transition. As the economy  experiences  systemic  transformations  and becomes  more market
oriented and more open to the outside world, it undergoes various social,  political,  and
institutional  changes  as well. Economic  growth together with pension reforms  will  change  the
15original  pattem of income distribution  among different interest groups. People's expectations
and decisions  on consumption  and savings,  on labor supply and wage demand,  and on inter-
and intra- generational income  redistribution  have to be reshaped  to better reflect  the economic
and social  realities. To minimize  disruption  associated with the transitional  distortions,
governments  have to formulate  strategies  and policies to deepen reforms and rnitigate  the
potential social costs of reforms. Legal and regulatory frameworks have to be set up to
govem design and management of pension and social security systems and to specify  the
sharing of responsibilities  for financing retirement pensions among state, enterprises, and
individual employees. The labor  market needs to be more flexible  and labor  more mobile.
Financial  markets need to be developed  to stimulate efficient  resource allocation. Incentives
are needed to ensure adequate  national  savings and capital accumulation. Administrative
interventions  of governments  in supporting  the elderly needs to be rationalized.  Without
socially  sustainable  economic  growth, social security reforms are unlikely  to be successful.
Meanwhile,  an appropriate  old age support system can be supportive  to a desirable
growth process, generating  a number  of positive extemalities. These include stimulating
capital formation and labor mobility,  and encouraging productive investments. One of the most
pressing issues in China at present is to integrate pension reforms with restructuring of
state-owned enterprises (SOEs).  As in many other historically socialist countries, SOEs in
China directly provide their employees with housing, pension, child care, health care, and
other benefits to cover nearly all living needs throughout their lifetime "from cradle to
grave".  In some of the older enterprises, the pensioner-employee ratio has reached a level
of one-to-one.  In a planned regime, profits were taken away and resources were allocated
according to plan, hence the pension burden on individual enterprises was not a serious
concem.  With marketization, individual  enterprises have hard budget constraints imposed
and become directly responsible  for profits and losses.  Pension expenditure tums out to
be a big burden too heavy to carry forward for many SOEs.  Even when the core business
of an enterprise is profitable, it may show losses because of its large pension outflows; and
thus its capacity to operate, borrow, and expand suffers. A large number of pensioners
have not been able to get what was promised to them just because of the accident of their
16being assigned in the past to an enterprise that is not making enough money now. This
system, insufficient in some cases and unfair in other cases, seriously impedes  labor
mobility and productivity and leads to delays for enterprise reforms.  Bankruptcy of an
SOE raises difficult issues of how to honor the pension commitments and other social
welfare obligations to its retirees.  Therefore, it is very important and urgent to formulate
and implement a strategy to develop a market-based pension system and a robust social
safety net, freeing enterprises of direct welfare responsibilities and thereby helping reform
the enterprise system. In order to de-link the enterprise from provision of all retirement
income and to share the costs of retirement programs among enterprises, the central
government has recently encouraged local governments to experiment in setting up
pension pools.  This to a certain degree has relieved some enterprises of full direct
responsibility for their worker's retirement pensions since resources and risks are pooled
among enterprises. However, governments need to accelerate their programs to widen
pension, unemployment and health insurance pools and improve financial  linkages between
contributions and benefits. Meanwhile, the pooled pension schemes need to enlarge their
coverage, especially to include employees in collective (township and village) enterprises,
foreign joint ventures, and individual  private enterprises, who are becoming increasingly
more numerous in number and more important in economic contributions.
These four areas of concerns  are closely  intertwined  with the overall  issue of how best
to address  the old age income security  in China,  when its population is aging  at a remarkable
pace. The key point here is that a social  security system shall  not be viewed as a purely
accounting  or even economic  matter. Pension reforms need to take into consideration  the
cultural  background, respect traditional  values, formulate long-term  visions  on demographic
trends and economic  growth, and adjust  macroeconomic  policies  to smooth this social
transition.
17Ill.  A Simple  Simulation  Model for Pension  Reforms
To quantitatively analyze policy implication of pension reforms, a mathematical
model is a necessary though not sufficient tool.  Ideally, a comprehensive dynamic general
equilibrium model might be better to reflect interdependence of economic factors in policy
reforms.  However, such a model would impose more data and resource requirements.
This section describes a simple simulation model, which is composed of four blocks
illustrating interrelations among (a) a representative pension fund, (b) demographic trends,
(c) development of the economy and labor market, and (d) government behavior under
different pension arrangements. Figure 6 below presents key inter-links among these
factors.
Figure 6  Links Among Pension Performance and Socio-Economic Development
Govemrment  Culture  and
~~A  ~Behavior  Tradition
Demographic  >  Pension  _  Economic
Dynamics  7n  \  nanceDevelopment
\  |  Labor Market  |  Pension
Conditions  Arrangements
Like the RMSM-X model used in the World Bank for medium term projections
and policy consistency check, the model proposed here is useful to examine  the financial
sustainability of pension funds and to show impacts of external changes and policy
alteration.  The model, however, has not explicitly endogenalized linkages between the
pension accounts and the affecting factors, such as savings through pension schemes and
18GDP growth, and between labor supply and wage-pernsion  'setting. In addition, the
treatment of uncertainty is done indirectly, though evaluating the effectiveness  of pension
reform options encounters numerous uncertainties.  To a certain extent, both demographic
dynamics and economic development are stochastic processes affected by many
unpredictable factors. With some information on prior probability distributions of these
random factors, the basic structure of the model can be used to generate bounds of
confidence intervals, such as in the scenario analysis through defining "the best" and "the
worst" possible situations. Another approach of addressing these uncertainties is through
stochastic numeric simulations (e.g. using Monte Cairo techniques).
Political economy of pension reforms is also difficult  to model.  Since pension
reforms necessarily redistribute income among different generations and among different
income groups within one generation.  Pareto optimality is difficult  to achieve during the
reform period.  These may have serious implications for social stability and longer-term
sustainable income growth
The Pension Fund Balance
During the planning period t  E  (to,  to +1, to +2,.., to +T}, the balance of a
representative pension fund in a specific region at time t, denoted by B,,  can be written as
B, = (1 + r,  )B,,  + I,  - O, - AE,,  for given B, 1l
where the increment is the difference between the current income (as the sum of  the
investment returns on the previous balance B,_ 1 at rate r, and the contribution inflow It) and
the current expenditure (as the sum of total pension payments 0, and the administrative
expenses AE, ).  This increment can be negative when the income cannot fully cover the
expenditure, and thus the fund decumulates.  Let se {M, F) be sex index for male and
female, respectively. Given A1' for the average first time working age and A2' for the
retirement age, the total contribution to the fund can be calculated as
19I,= z  ZC,Wa,N,S
5srM.F}  a-AI
where c, is the pension-related payroll tax rate, W'-'  is the nominal average wage for
workers at age a and N,'-5  is the number of workers covered by the pension scheme. The
summations are conducted over both age and sex.  Meanwhile the total pension payments
can be calculated as
As
0,=  N
sE(M.F)  a=A  -+l
where A3' is the maximum  age and H,''  is a basis for pension calculation,  which can be
linked to the pensioners' personal wage history, past contributions to the fund, the wage
profile of current workers, inflation, or some other social or policy factors.  The
replacement rate, Ot, specifies the benefit a pensioner will receive as a portion of the
pension basis. Thus, in a functional form,
Ha,s  =  a` 3(w,  i,)
where w and i are wage and inflation matrices.  In some cases, H can be zero if the person
is not eligible for pension benefits. The administrative cost is affected by many factors,
including the fund balance (portfolio management, cash flows, and some fixed cost.  For
simplicity,, the administrative  cost in our simulation is taken as a portion of the average of
the total income and total payments of the fund balance, i.e.,
AEt  =ei  + 
2
where e, captures the cost effectiveness of the fund management.
20Demographic  Dynamics  and Labor Market
At time t, the magnitude and age structure of the population can be presented as a
simple first order Markov chain,
pa,s  = (I -ma5)Ia1 +NI' 3, foraE  int(O,  A3
5]
where Pt"'  is the population of sex s at age a, mt, is the mortality rate, and NIL' is the net
immigrants into the region.
49
pO's  =  (  o  _  )  a,s
arrap
a=20
where rn,°' is the infant mortality rate for the first year after birth, and f,' is the fertility rate
of a woman at age a, which depends critically on the population policy, social custom, and
current and expected economic conditions including the cost of raising a child. The old-
age dependence ratio, d, is defined as




The size of the labor force can be written as
La,s  =  a,spa.:
where I,'-' is the labor participation rate across ages and sexes.  Here, the participation
rates for the young and the old are set to zero, namely, I'  = I1'f =0 for a E int[O,  Al') and
acint[A2', A3'].  The total employment E,'  is the product of the labor force and the
employment rate, 1-u,'", namely,
E`  =  (1-  U)La  5  for as int[Aj', A2')
21The pension scheme coverage can be presented by
I  {a.sEa.s  for  A,  a<A
lt(E-m')NL"j"',  for  AX  < a  <  A
where c't" is the contribution coverage ratio.
Economic and Wage  Growth
The economy is assumed to follow a growth pattern, which is affected by a number
of factors including population growth, labor productivity improvement, technological and
management innovations, and govermnent policies.  For simplicity,  we only emphasize  the
linkage between the increase of real wage, w,a.', with the growth of per capita output, gt,
i.e.,
where w( ) is a functional form and the real wage in the base year is set to be 1.
For given price level in the base year P0 and a path of inflation rates, Tr;  the nominal wage
then can be calculated as
Wa,5 =  Wa,JP  n l 
r= 
Government  Behavior  under  Different Pension  Arrangements
The government may have multiple objectives in pension design and reforms. The
simplest approach is to assume that the government attempts to maximize  a well-defined
social welfare function, which takes into consideration (indirect) utility functions of all
individuals in the society. Hence generally, the govermnent's behavior shall  be derived
from the following maximization  framework
22Max SWF = SWF(Vi, jEP)
subject to all the relevant constraints. Here P is the union of all categories of people in the
society and Vi is the expected life-time indirect utility of an individual  j, which mainly
depends on the individual's income stream (wages when he/she works and pension benefit
after he/she retires), variations of price levels, his/her own time preference parameters, and
probability distributions on future uncertainties.  Namely,
Vi = E{v'[(Wt',  OtH); x,]}
Policy instruments available to the government vary with different kinds of pension
arrangements.  Four out of many commonly adopted pension schemes, namely a Pay-as-
you-go scheme, a defined benefit scheme, a defined contribution scheme, and a private
fund-type scheme, are discussed here.  Through some aggregation, policy implications of
reforming to a multi-pillar  system as advocated by the World Bank can also be simulated.
For the purpose of policy simulations here, uniformity is assumed across individuals so
that the whole society can be treated as a unit.  When the policy focus turns from the
solvency of pension fiunds  to income redistribution, the model needs considerable
modification.
Pay-As-You-Go Scheme
Strictly speaking, this scheme requires that the pension fund be balanced in each
and every single year during the whole planning period.  In practice, pensions are usually
indexed to wages and financed by a pay-roll tax.  In this case, B, = 0 for all t, i.e.,
I,  = O, + AE,
23where the total income of the pension scheme cover exactly the sum of the total pension
payments and the administrative cost at each period t.  Given the demographic dynamics,
the pension-wage linkage, and the administrative efficiency, the behavior of the
government can be derived as
3As
l+e'  E,  ,H,  Na,,
*  ~~2  JEJM,F) a=A2  +l
Min  c  =  2  A2  for all t, Mm1  1-2  E  Wa;  ya
CC  2  Wr~~z~a.sNt.
sE{CM.F) a=AI
where [c m , c']  is the feasible region for the contribution rate.  Under the Pay-As-You-
Go system, there will be no explicit or implicit debts generated from pension fund
insolvency accumulating through time.  But the required minimum contribution rate
changes from year to year, and could increase to a level socially unbearable when the
population ages.
Defined Contribution System
Within the defined  contribution  system, the contribution  rate is usually  fixed  at a certain
level c=ct. The government can choose to set a uniform  replacement  rate (00,)  to the highest
possible  while  the pension  fund is maintained  with positive balances during  the planning  period.
This translates  into
Max {(}0
[Omi,nmax]
where [e"", O']  is the feasible region for the benefit rate.  This maximization  is subject to
Bt > 0 and that all other relations specified above hold.  The disadvantage of this kind of
pension system is that when the ratio between the numbers of the pensioners and workers
becomes larger over time, the benefit received by the pensioners will decline significantly.
24Defined Benefit System
A defined benefit pension system specifies the pension path a retiree will receive
during the period after he or she retires.  The government minimizes the required
contribution rate, which can be assumed uniform through time for simplicity,  because
doing so increases the disposable income of the workers without scarifying pensioners'
welfare.  Therefore, policy simulations can be based on all the accounting and economic
relations specified above and the following optimization framework:
Min  {C},  subject to B, 2 0,
[c;  ]
where [c  , c']  is the feasible region for the contribution rate.  The potential problem
with this system is that even with a very moderate replacement rate, the burden for the
contributing workers could be too heavy as the population ages.
Private Pension Fund Accounts System
One critical argument for publicly managed social security system is rooted in
paternalistic concerns-the  belief that many individuals, if left to themselves, could be
myopic in their consumption-savings behavior and thus would not save enough to sustain
their living standards after retirement. Therefore, everyone in the society needs to be
mandated to save at least a minimum  portion of his or her income before the retirement
age.  A private account can be established to record the savings. Within this system a
worker pays a certain percentage of his wage to the fund when he works and receive a
pension after he retires according to the amount of his total savings and investment
returns.
Let c be the portion of wage a worker sets aside for his retirement, then his life
time savings values at the time of retirement, A2',  will be
A2A
Al=  (CW -AEr  )AI  (1 + r, 
25t=A,'  T=I
2  5where AE, is the personal transaction cost of maintaining the account and r, is the interest
rate.  If the possibility of receiving and giving bequest is ignored, namely,
BA'  =0
and the pension he derives from his personal fund is an annuity fully indexed with the
inflation, then
B, = (1+r,)B,l  -o  07(1+  Jrr)  fort  E int[A 2'+1 A3
1 ].
r=A21+l
where 0 is the real annuity valued at time of retirement.  The worker's problem is then to
find an appropriate c for a given 0  or to derive an acceptable 0  for a given c.  The
government can affect individual  workers choice through its macroeconomic policies
which exercise direct impact on wage levels, interest rates, real and expected levels of
inflation, and the transaction cost of maintaining private pension funds.
A Multi-pillar Pension System
Recent work by the World Bank (1994) suggests  that a combination  of multiple  pillars
of old age income  support may  be most suitable. There should  be some minimum  pension
guaranteed  by the state to all pensioners. This would then be complemented  by a second leg
which would allow  for each person to contribute  to an individual  account. The idea is that the
former would help to protect the poorer members of society  but also those who are not able or
choose not to save for retirement. The latter would allow  for each person to save with
appropriate  safeguards  and achieve  certain .iving standards for their old age. In order to meet
these needs, various individual  pension options warrant careful consideration  but it is also
important  to weigh the overall  implications.  This might be done in the context of the four
options noted above.
26IV.  Pension  System  Reform in China
This section turns to analyze policy options for pension system reforms in China.
First, some aspects of the evolution of the Chinese pension systems since 1978 are
reviewed.  This helps to calibrate parameters essential for simulating  policy reforms based
on the simulation model presented in the last section.  A benchmark case is then worked
out to show that the current pension arrangements are unlikely to remain financially
sustainable for more thanr-frty years if no reforms are undertaken.  Then some policy
simulations are conducted to numerically illustrate implications of different reform options.
The Current Pension System in China
Out of a total labor force of more than 600 million, existing pension schemes cover
about 150 million,  mostly employees  of state enterprises,  government  staff, plus a portion of
urban collectives. These  schemes,  many of which are not financially  healthy  at present, leave
uncovered about 75 percent of labor force, mainly  rural peasants,  urban contract  workers, and
employees  of individual  firms. Permanent workers'  pensions are publicly  managed and
basically financed by payroll taxes on a pay-as-you-go basis. Enterprises share a part of
the financial  burden through contributing a portion of permanent employee's current wage
to the pension pool.  Retirement age is relatively young, 60 for men and 55 for women.
Many workers retire early for health reasons or disability,  in most cases receiving  full
benefits.  Contribution rates vary across regions and sectors and may apply to different
bases.  Financial and actuarial linkages between contributions and benefits are not always
clear.  Pension funds are usually deposited in local bank accounts that are often less-than-
fully indexed with inflation. Local interest in keeping financial  resources within the
localities do not always lead to investments with highest possible returns. Over time, the
aging of China's population means that pension expenditures as currently structured will
increase dramatically  from 12.7% of the total wages in 1987 to almost 20% by 1997, to
25% by 2010 and to over 48% by 2030.  Table 3 below presents some statistics  that
quantitatively  summarize  development  of China's formal pension  systems  between 1978 and
1993.
27Table 3
China: Pension and Wage Statistics 1978-1993
Pensioners  Employees  Employee  Average Pension  Average Wa e  Pension Wage Ratio  GNP  CPI
Number  Growth  Number  Growth  Pensioner  Nominal I Real 78  Growth  Nominal I  Real 78  Growth  Average  Total  Growth  Change
million  %  million  %  Ratio  Yuan  %  Yaun  %  __  %
1978  3.1  95.0  30.3  551.0  551.0  615.0  615.0  89.6  3.0  11.7  0.7
1979  6.0  89.8  99.7  4.9  16.7  714.0  700.0  27.0  668.0  654.9  6.5  106.9  6.4  7.6  2.0
1980  8.2  36.9  104.4  4.8  12.8  714.0  660.4  (5.7)  762.0  704.8  7.6  93.7  7.3  7.9  6.0
1981  9.5  16.4  109.4  4.7  11.5  706.0  637.7  (3.4)  772.0  697.3  (1.1)  91.5  7.9  4.4  2.4
1982  11.1  17.2  112.8  3.1  10.1  709.0  628.4  (1.4)  798.0  707.3  1.4  88.8  8.8  8.8  1.9
1983  12.9  16.1  115.2  2.1  8.9  726.0  634.0  0.9  826.0  721.3  2.0  87.9  9.9  10.4  1.5
1984  14.8  14.4  118.9  3.3  8.0  766.0  650.7  2.6  974.0  827.4  14.7  78.6  9.8  14.7  2.8
1985  16.4  10.8  123.6  3.9  7.5  935.0  730.0  12.2  1,148.0  896.3  8.3  81.4  10.8  12.8  8.8
1986  18.1  10.3  128.1  3.6  7.1  983.0  724.1  (0.8)  1,329.0  978.9  9.2  74.0  10.4  8.1  6.0
1987  19.7  9.0  132.1  3.2  6.7  1083.0  743.5  2.7  1,459.0  1,001.6  2.3  74.2  11.1  10.9  7.3
1988  21.2  7.7  136.1  3.0  6.4  1322.0  765.8  3.0  1,747.0  1,012.0  1.0  75.7  11.8  11.0  18.5
1989  22.0  3.8  137.4  1.0  6.2  1450.0  713.1  (6.9)  1,935.0  951.6  (6.0)  74.9  12.0  4.0  17.8
1990  23.0  4.5  140.6  2.3  6.1  1726.0  831.3  16.6  2,140.0  1,030.7  8.3  80.7  13.2  5.8  2.1
1991  24.3  5.7  145.1  3.2  6.0  1936.0  906.2  9.0  2,340.0  1,095.3  6.3  82.7  13.9  6.1  2.9
1992  26.0  6.8  147.9  2.0  5.7  2260.0  1003.7  10.8  2,711.0  1,204.0  9.9  83.4  14.6  13.6  5.4
1993  27.8  7.0  148.5  0.4  5.3  2779.0  1090.2  8.6  3,371.0  1,322.5  9.8  82.4  15.4  13.4  13.2
Source: Chinese Statistics Press -- Yearbook of Labor Statistics of China 1994During these sixteen  years between 1978 and 1993, pension-covered  employment  grew
by 56.3 percent while  the retirees  supported by the pension systems  increased  by close  to eight
times, leading the employee-pensioner  ratio declining  dramatically from 30.3 in 1978  to only
5.3 in 1993. This ratio will  continue  to decline  when more people who joined the labor force in
1950s  and early 1960s  reach  the retirement  age. While the pension-wage  ratio on average
remained  relatively  stable around 80 percent in recent years, the total pension  expenditure
increased  remarkably  from 3.0 percent of the total wage bill  in 1978  to 10.8 percent  in 1985,
and then to 15.4 percent in 1993. This occurred because the pension scheme  was of a defined-
benefit type and the number  of pensioners  increased sharply from 3.1 million  in 1978  to 16.4
million  in 1985, and then to 27.8 million  in 1993. People outside of the public  pension
coverage rely mainly  on private savings  and family supports for their old age income  security.
This explains,  at least partially,  why China's gross domestic savings  (GDS) rate can  be as high
as 35 to 40 percent.
Real growth of GNP per capita, average wage, and average pension were not closely
correlated. In 1988 and 1989,  when GNP grew by 11.0 percent and 4.0 percent,  respectively,
the real average wage rose by only 1.0  percent in 1988 and actually  declined  by 6.0 percent in
1989. High inflation  - 18.5 percent in 1988 and 17.8 percent in 1989 - completely  eroded
moderate  gains in nomninal  wage. Correspondingly,  the real average pension rose slightly  by
3.0 percent in 1988 and dropped by 6.9 percent in 1989. This may be one of the reasons
leading to social  unrest in many  regions in 1989. To investigate  how real wage growth is
linked to GDP growth and inflation  rate, we run a regression using data presented  in Table 3
and get the following  result:
'  = 0.8786gt  - 0.4060irt,  R2= 0.525, F = 7.183
WI l  (5.94)  (-2.383)
where the numbers in brackets are t-statistics, showing that the regression is significant  at
level a=5%.  Hence, the real wage gains about 0.88 percent if GDP grows by one more
percent, while an increase in inflation of one percent is associated with a 0.4 percent
erosion of the workers' gain. Figure 7 shows historical paths of GDP growth, pension and
wage movements, and changes in numbers of contributors and pensioners, respectively.
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Number of Emnployees  per 100 pmsaasersThe  Need for Pension  Reforms:  The Benchmark  Case
The model specified above is utilized to simulate policy sensitivities of reforming
pension systems in China for 80 years between 1995 and 2075.  The basic demographic
information is extracted from the World Bank Population Projections (World Bank,
1995). Key parameters are calibrated using historical data published by Chinese
authroties.  Essential assumptions are spelt out based on reasonable judgment of Chinese
economic outlook in the next century.  For simplicity, many indicators are kept uniform
through time, but these can be changed as deemed appropriate.
Base Year Parameters
In the base year 1995, the initial balance of all pension funds in urban areas, which
are treated as a single fund hereafter, remains in the neighborhood of 100 billion Yuan or
1.8 percent of the total GDP.  The average annual wages for a male and a female worker
in 1995 are estimated to be around five thousand Yuan.  A simple replacement ratio
between the average pension and the average wage is used, which stands at 75 percent in
1995. Thus the average pensions for a male, who retires at age of 60, and a female
pensioner, who retires at 55, in 1995 are estimated to be around 3.75 thousand Yuan.
Key Assumptions
Table 4 summarizes some key assumptions for the simulation exercises. Real
GDP is assumed to grow at an average rate of 10 percent per annum until 2000 and then
at a lower rate of  7.5 percent between 2001 and 2049.  Since 2050, GDP growth stablizes
at 5% per annum. The annual inflation rate declines from 10 percent during 1996-2000 to
7.5 percent between 2001 to 2049 and then to 5 percent starting from 2050. The growth
of real wage depends on the GDP growth and inflation path, according to the formula
specified in the regression equation presented in the last section. Nominal wages are fully
indexed to inflation
31Table 4
China: Major Assumptions for Public  Pension  System Analysis
(The Base Case)
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2010  2025  2050  2075
GDP Growth (%)  10  10  10  10  10  10  7.5  7.5  5  5
Inflation Rate (X)  10  10  10  10  10  10  5  5  3.5  3.5
Real  Wage  Growth (%)  4.7  4.7  4.7  4.7  4.7  4.7  4.6  4.6  3.0  3.0
Contribution Rate  (X)  27  27  27  27  27  27  27  27  27  27
Replacement  Rate  (X)  75  75  75  75  75  75  75  75  75  75
Administrative  Cost Ratio  (X)  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3
Real  Rate  of Retums  on Fund Reserves  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2
Price  Index  I  1.10  1.21  1.33  1.46  1.61  2.62  5.45  13.85  32.73
Real  Wage  (Yuan '000)  5.0  5.2  5.5  5.7  6.0  6.3  9.8  19.2  43.1  89.6
Nominal Wage (Yuan '000)  5.0  5.8  6.6  7.6  8.8  10.1  25.8  104.7  597.0  2,934.0
Real  GDP (Y. trillion)  5.5  6.1  6.7  7.3  8.1  8.9  18.3  54.0  205.8  696.8
Nominal GDP (Y. trillion)  5.5  6.7  8.1  9.7  11.8  14.3  47.9  294.6  2,849.8  22,806.4During the next 80 years, the replacement rate is averaged at 75 percent, while the
contribution rate is averaged 27 percent under the selected pension arrangements. The
administrative cost is assumed to be 3 percent  of the average of pension fund receipts and
payments.  The real rate of returns from investment of the pension fund balance is
assumed to be 2 percent across time.
The urbanization  speed is taken to be 0.3 percent per annum,  leading  the urban
population as a share in the total national population increasing gradually from 29.6
percent in 1995 to 38.4 percent in 2030 and to 50 percent in 2075.  This compares with 54
percent in low-middle-income  economies on average in 1993. The urban labor
participation rate averages 90 percent, and the unemployment rate is kept around 3
percent.
Pressure from Population Aging
Under these assumptions for the benchmark case, the pressure from population
aging is apparent.  Table 5 below presents a projected population structure and pension
coverage for China from 1995 to 2075.  The population dependency rate, in terms of  the
number of persons older than the retirement age per 100 working age persons, increases
from about 21 in 1995 to 44 around 2025 and then rises again to nearly 70 in 2075.  The
system dependency ratio, in terms of the number of  pensioners per 100 contributors,
decreases initially  from 21 in 1995 to  15 around 2000 when the pension coverage rate for
the working age population extends from 25 percent to 38.5 percent, as projected. This
implies more contributors will  join the pension pool in the near future. However, this
system dependency rate quickly rebounds to 35.1 in 2025 and approaches the population
dependence rate in 2075, as the population structure and the pension system mature. If the
young dependents are also taken into consideration, the total dependency rate will be in
the neighborhood of 100 around 2025.
33Table 5
China: Projection  of Population  Structure and Public  Pension  System Coverage
(The Base Case)
1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2010  2025  2050  2075
Population  (Thousand)  1,218,134  1,230,499  1,244,183  1,259,230  1,275,670  1,293,548  1,420,314  1,597,166  1,763,793  1,821,789
Young  (below age 20)  424,807  427,741  430,939  434,418  438,185  442,255  444,272  436,160  436,950  438,226
Working  656,096  662,532  669,943  678,345  687,760  698,218  766,834  807,431  810,387  814,603
SVstem Covered  164,025  186,701  208,267  228,990  249,105  268,813  416,853  507,362  527,935  532,052
Not Covered  492,071  475,831  461,676  449,355  438,655  429,404  349,981  300,069  282,453  282,551
Old  137,231  140,224  143,301  146,467  149,725  153,076  209,208  353,575  516,455  568,960
System Covered  34,308  35,057  36,092  37,388  38,924  40,678  75,676  178,327  312,402  360,693
Not Covered  102,923  105,169  107,209  109,079  110,801  112,398  133,532  175,248  204,053  208,267
An Percentage of Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Young  34.9  34.8  34.6  34.5  34.3  34.2  31.3  27.3  24.8  24.1
Working  53.9  53.8  53.8  53.9  53.9  54.0  54.0  50.6  45.9  44.7
Covered  13.5  15.2  16.7  18.2  19.5  20.8  29.3  31.8  29.9  29.2
Not Covered  40.4  38.7  37.1  35.7  34.4  33.2  24.6  18.8  16.0  15.5
Old  11.3  11.4  11.5  11.6  11.7  11.8  14.7  22.1  29.3  31.2
Covered  2.8  2.8  2.9  3.0  3.1  3.1  5.3  11.2  17.7  19.8
Not Covered  8.4  8.5  8.6  8.7  8.7  8.7  9.4  11.0  11.6  11.4
System  Coverage Rate 1%1
Young  25.0  28.2  31.1  33.8  36.2  38.5  54.4  62.8  65.1  65.3
Old  25.0  25.0  25.2  25.5  26.0  26.6  36.2  50.4  60.5  63.4
Dependency Rates 1%)
Population  20.9  21.2  21.4  21.6  21.8  21.9  27.3  43.8  63.7  69.8
System  20.9  18.8  17.3  16.3  15.6  15.1  18.2  35.1  59.2  67.8
Young  64.7  64.6  64.3  64.0  63.7  63.3  57.9  54.0  53.9  53.8
Total  85.7  85.7  85.7  85.6  85.5  85.3  85.2  97.8  117.6  123.6
Source: Word  Bank Population ProjectionS and authorS'  estimates.The Base Case Scenario
In the current pay-as-you-go pension system continues in to future without any
reform measures being undertaken, China's pension system will not be financially
sustainable.  Table 6 below presents simulation results, with four indicators suggests the
insolvency of the simulated pension fund.  First, the fund's current balance turns negative
in 2025, meaning that total receipts of the fund are not sufficient to cover the due
payments and administrative  cost.  Second, the accumulated balance of the fund, which
may peak at more than 30 percent of current GDP around 2010 when baby boomers are
the backbone of the working force and the pension coverage expands quickly,  becomes
negative before 2050.  Third, on a counter-factual basis, the pension cost rate is defined as
the contribution rate required to obtain zero current balance for a given total pension
payment.  This cost rate in China rises from 12 percent in 2000 to 28 percent in 2025 and
then to 54 percent in 2075, doubling the assumed contribution rate.  A pension
contribution rate higher than 30 percent is not likely to be socially acceptable. Finally, the
affordable replacement rate can maintain above the assumed benefit rate until 2025.  After
that the affordable benefit rate drops to 32.7 percent, about a half the assumed benefit
rate.
Clearly, financial  sustainability  is only one out of many demands for reforming the
pension system in China. However, the strength of this demand is remarkably  strong.
Since pension policies impact over a long period, small incremental changes on annual
basis can accumulate into enormous effects across time.  As shown in Table 6, if the
pension system were not modified, the negative accumulative balance of the pension fund
in 2075 can reach an unbearable level of 41 percent of current GDP.  Or alternatively,
China can only afford to support half of its pensioners, who in fact have contributed to the
pension fund throughout their working life.
35Table 6
China: Pension Fund Accounts under Pay-As-You-Go  Scheme
(The Base Case)
_  _ _ _  _ _ _  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2010  2025  2050  2075
With  Reserves (Y. Billion)
Revenue Collection  221.4  290.4  373.1  472.6  592.2  736.2  2,904.6  14,345.2  85,098.9  421,487.9
Per-,:an Payments  128.7  151.4  179.6  214.3  257.1  309.5  1,464.7  14,005.7  139,879.8  793,718.1
Administrative  Cost  5.3  6.6  8.3  10.3  12.7  15.7  65.5  425.3  3,374.7  18,228.1
Current Balance  88  132  185  248  322  411  1,374  (86)  (58,156)  (390,458)
As %  of GDP  1.6  2.0  2.3  2.5  2.7  2.9  2.9  (0.0)  (2.0)  (1.7)
Investment  Returns  12  29  55  91  141  895  5,355  (20,208)  (465,750)
Accumulative  Balance  100  244  459  762  1,176  1,728  15,059  81,763  (445,787)  (9,324,392)
As %  of GDP  1.8  3.7  5.7  7.8  10.0  12.1  31.4  27.8  (15.6)  (40.9)
NPV  100  222  379  572  803  1,073  5,740  14,992  (32,187)  (284,880)
With  Zero Current Balance
Cost Rate (%)  16.17  14.95  13.80  13.00  12.44  12.05  14.46  27.99  47.13  53.99
Affordable  Benefit  Rate (%)  125.3  139.5  151.2  160.5  167.7  173.2  144.3  74.5  44.3  38.7
Supportable  Coverage Rate for the Old  41.8  46.5  50.8  54.6  58.1  61.4  69.6  50.1  35.7  32.7
Needed Coverage Rate for the  Working Age  15.0  15.1  15.4  15.8  16.2  16.7  28.2  63.2  110.3  126.7
No. of Supportable  Pensioners  57,304  65,226  72,760  80,000  87,027  93,912  145,632  177,252  184,439  185,877
No. of Needed Contributors  98,203  100,346  103,309  107,019  111,415  116,436  216,613  510,440  894,213  1,032,440
An Compared with  Benchmark In %
Contribution  Rate  59.9  55.4  51.1  48.2  46.1  44.6  53.5  103.7  174.5  200.0
Benefit Rate  167.0  186.1  201.6  214.0  223.6  230.9  192.4  99.4  59.0  51.5
In 1995  Yuan
Real Wage  5.00  5.24  5.48  5.74  6.01  6.30  9.84  19.20  43.11  89.64
Real Pension  3.75  3.93  4.11  4.31  4.51  4.72  7.38  14.40  32.33  67.23
As %  of 1995
Real Wage  100.00  104.73  109.68  114.86  120.29  125.97  196.75  384.03  862.11  1,792.83
Real Pension  100.00  104.73  109.68  114.86  120.29  125.97  196.75  384.03  862.11  1,792.83Policy Simulations  for Reform Options
Apparently,  pension  refonns  cannot  be avoided  in China. The issues  turn to what  to do
and when. This subsection  simulates  implications  of various  reform  options  for pension
systems.  With  the simulation  model,  policies  in four broader  areas  can  be simulated:
(a)  macroeconomic  development,  such as real GDP growth, inflation,  and
unemployment;
(b)  labor market  condition,  including  labor participation,  real  wage growth,  and
change  of retirement  age;
(c)  demographic  dynamics,  mainly  changes  of mortality  rates, migration,  urbanization,
and life expectancy;  and
(d)  pension  fund management,  such as effective  coverage  rate, contribution  rate,
compliance  rate, eligibility  conditions,  changes  of  benefits  in nominal  and  real  terms,
real returns from investment  of fund surplus,  administration  costs, adjustment  of
linkage  between  real  wage and real pension,  and inflation  indexing  mechanism.
Out of many  possible  combinations  of policy  options,  the impact  of three changes
are illustrated. The first simulation  shows  the effects  of delaying  retirement  age. The
second shows  the possible  consequences  of different  GDP growth paths. The last
simulation  compares  trade-offs  between  raising  contribution  rates and lowing  benefit  rates.
Delaying Retirement Age
The most direct  impact  of delaying  the retirement  age is to change  the system
dependency  rate of the pension  system  through  enlarging  the labor participation  rate for
old people. The impact  can be dramatic,  since  the effect  is doubled  when  the number  of
pensioners  is reduced  while  the number  of contributors  is increased. Thus old age
problem  is converted  into the (un)employment  problem  with pressures  on real  wage
growth. Without endogenalizing  the relationships  among  GDP growth,  labor  demand  and
supply,  and real wage changes,  it is difficult  to predict  the potential  outcome. Here, only
population  dependence  rates are plotted in Figure 8 for three sets of retirement  age.
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- -4  - s  C~4  e  s  s  eseThe key policy  issue here is how the society  as a whole  absorbs  this segment  of old
age labor. For China,  the unemployment  and under-employment  in the urban  areas  are
becoming  more apparent. Transition  in agriculture  is releasing  a large  amount  of surplus
labor, close  to 100  million  in recent years. The government  needs  to weigh  the cost
against  the benefit  of dealing  with either  the pension  problem  or the unemployment
problem. The latter  may  be more politically  sensitive  and more  uncertain  in financial
terms. Without  excess  demand  in the labor market,  it would  not be a desirable  option  to
increase  the retirement  age.
Change  of GDP Growth Path
Promoting  GDP  growth enlarges  the pie to be shared  by the old and  the young.
Without  long run stable  income  growth, neither pensioners  nor contributors  can expect  to
improve  their living  standards  steadily. Better growth performance  means  higher  real
wage, leads  to larger  contribution  revenue for the pension  fund,  and leaves  some  leeway
for adjustment  of benefit  rate. Table 7 compares  three cases  with the base case,  for
different  GDP growth  paths and pension-wage  indexation.  The first  thing  to notice  here is
that, as shown  in the last line  of Table  7, one percentage  point change  (faster  or slower)  in
the real GDP growth  rate can double  or half the real wage  and pension,  as compared  to
that in the base case  scenario. The magnitude  of this effect  depends  on the length  of
pension  planning  period  (80 years  here). Even allowing  the pensioners'  benefit  rate to
shrink  over time,  as shown  in the last column of Table  7, their  welfare  measured  in real
pension  income  is significantly  improved  when the GDP grows  faster  than  in the base case.
Secondly,  it is noticeable  that even a combination  of faster  growth  and less  than full  wage
indexation  will not necessarily  makes the pension  fund  financially  solvent. Higher  growth
leads to higher  wage,  and thus higher  pension. However,  this  combination  delays  the first
year for the current  and accumulative  balance of the pension  fund  to be negative  by 4
years and 9 years,  respectively. Finally,  it is worthwhile  to look at the break-even
contribution  and benefit  rates of the pension funds,  which  are assumed  to be uniform
across years  and to be required  to achieve  a zero accumulative  balance  at the end of the
39Table  7
China: Impact of GDP Growth on Pension Fund Solvency
Base  GDP Growth
Case  Slower by 1%  Faster by 1  %
Wage Indexation  100%  100%  100%  90%
Break-even  Contribution  Rate  39.6  37.5  41.5  31.8
As % of the Assumed  146.8  138.9  153.7  117.8
Break-even  Replacement  Rate  51.1  54.0  48.7  63.7
As % of the Assumed  68.1  72.0  65.0  84.9
The First Year for
Negative Current Balance  2025  2025  2025  2029
Negative  Fund Reserves  2041  2043  2039  2052
Fund Reserve as % of Current GDP
2030  18.1  22.7  14.4  21.8
2050  -15.6  -13.7  -16.3  1
2075  -40.9  -47.9  -34.5  -11.4
Real Wage/Pension  as % of 1995  Real Pension
2030  479.9  357.2  643.2  536.3
2050  646.6  546.2  1,369.4  1060.1
2075  1,792.8  907.5  3,521.7  2480.4planning period.  One percent faster GDP growth plus 90 percent wage indexation
reduces the break-even contribution rate from 40 to 32 percent, and increases the break-
even replacement rate from 51 to 64 percent.
Changing  the Contribution Rate and the Replacement Rate
Another commonly recommended policy option is to raise the contribution rate or
to reduce the replacement rate, or both.  While knowing that this option is politically
difficult, we conduct a numerical simulation to examine the financial implication  of the
policy recommendation. The outcome is presented as a sensitivity trade-off table, shown
in Table 8.  Starting from the base case point where the contribution rate is 27 percent
and the replacement rate is 75 percent.  Raising the contribution rate to 3  5 percent or
reducing the replacement rate to 60 percent alone will reduce the negative pension balance
level as percentage of current GDP at the end of 2075 from 41 percent to around 15
percent.  Moving towards the lower left corner is the direction for pension solvency,  but
objections from both pensioners (for a lower replacement rate) and the contributors (for a
higher contribution rate).  To achieve a near-zero balance at the end of the planning
period, one needs to set the contribution rate at 32 percent and the replacement rate at 60
percent, or the contribution rate at 33 percent and the replacement rate at 62.5 percent.
Fully Funded Individual Accounts
The individual  pension accounts specified in the model are fully funded by
definition.  They are self-balanced  if the uncertainties on investment returns and life
expectancy are carefully  handled, through pooling, for instance.  The relevant policy issues
here are the positive linkage between the contribution rate and the benefit rate.  The
government needs to make sure most people in the society save sufficient for their own
old age expenditure. For China,  the private savings rate is usually around 35 percent.
Therefore, establishing personal notional pension accounts can be a feasible and effective
reform option in China.
41Table  8
Sensitivity of the Pension Fund Balance
with respect to Changes of Contribution Rate and Replacement Rate
(in % of Current GDP as of the end of 2075)
Contribution  Replacement  Rate
Rate  60.0  62.5  65.0  67.5  70.0  72.5  75.0  77.5  80.0  82.5  85.0
21  -34.6  -38.9  -43.2  -47.5  -51.7  -56.0  -60.3  -64.6  -68.8  -73.1  -77.4
22  -31.4  -35.7  -40.0  -44.2  -48.5  -52.8  -57.1  -61.3  -65.6  -69.9  -74.1
23  -28.2  -32.4  -36.7  -41.0  -45.3  -49.5  -53.8  -58.1  -62.4  -66.6  -70.9
24  -24.9  -29.2  -33.5  -37.8  -42.0  -46.3  -50.6  -54.9  -59.1  -63.4  -67.7
25  -21.7  -26.0  -30.3  -34.5  -38.8  -43.1  -47.4  -51.6  -55.9  -60.2  -64.5
26  -18.5  -22.7  -27.0  -31.3  -35.6  -39.8  -44.1  -48.4  -52.7  -56.9  -61.2
27  :JLZ  :195  -23.8  28.1  3l23  -36f6  A40.9  -45.2  494  -53.7  -9.
28  -12.0  -16.3  -20.6  -24.8  -29.1  -33.4  -37.7  -41.9  -46.2  -50.5  -54.8
29  -8.8  -13.0  -17.3  -21.6  -25.9  -30.1  -34.4  -38.7  -43.0  -47.2  -51.5
30  -5.5  -9.8  -14.1  -18.4  -22.6  -26.9  -31.2  -35.5  -39.7  -44.0  -48.3
31  -2.3  -6.6  -10.9  -15.1  -19.4  -23.7  -28.0  -32.2  -36.5  -40.8  -45.1
32  0.9  -3.3  -7.6  -11.9  -16.2  -20.4  -24.7  -29.0  -33.3  -37.5  -41.8
33  4.2  -0.1  -4.4  -8.7  -12.9  -17.2  -21.5  -25.8  -30.0  -34.3  -38.6
34  7.4  3.1  -1.2  -5.4  -9.7  -14.0  -18.3  -22.5  -26.8  -31.1  -35.4
35  10.6  6.4  2.1  -2.2  -6.5  -10.7  -15.0  -19.3  -23.6  -27.8  -32.1V.  Preliminary  Conclusions
Population aging and pension system reforms are serious challenges  to both
developed and developing countries in the coming decades.  Theoretical thinking and
policy debates in recent years, including Arrau and Schmidt-Hebbel (1994), Diamond
(1995), Iyer (1994), Rein (1994), Sayeed (1984), the World Bank (1994), have
contributed significant insights in finding sustainable solutions for providing income
support to the increasingly  number of elderly.  This paper proposes an integrated
framework linking pension reforms to macroeconomic development, demographic
dynamics, and labor market conditions. With basic assumptions on the future
development trends, the model specified in the paper can be utilized to simulate potential
impact of different reform options under different pension arrangements. These
simulations give decision-makers some quantitative indication on possible outcomes a
policy package can generate.
Based on the World Bank's  population projection for China, numerical  results
from the simulation exercises conducted in the paper suggest some important policy
messages. Notably, the scope and speed of population aging in China makes the present
pension system financially  unsustainable, even though the GDP is assumed to grow
steadily over a long period.  Pension reforms are inevitable. For the current pay-as-you-
go pension system, increasing retirement age would provide a temporary fix and would
only be politically viable when there is excess labor demand. Pension fund sustainability
can be improved by increasing GDP growth, raising contribution rates or gradually
reducing benefit rates.  But implementation of these reform options need careful
assessment of financial costs and social obstacles.  Establishing fully funded and privately
managed pension schemes can be a feasible and effective alternative, but sound regulatory
framework and institutional infrastructure need to be established to facilitate the transition.
43More generally, the following considerations should be useful for formulating
longer-term pension reform strategies.
First, pension system reform is a long-term problem of multi-dimension,  involving
not only economic, but also social, political, and cultural factors.  The governments
should not over-concentrate on the old age income security system pe se, relying
exclusively on taxes and transfers to achieve the goals of inter-generational or intra-
generational income redistribution. A more strategic approach with broader policy
options needs to be explored. Country characteristics, mostly importantly the cultural and
traditional values as well as expectations and reactions of different interest groups, have to
be taken into consideration..
Second, real income growth is the ultimate means to cope with poverty among the
old, especially in developing countries.  An important policy objective in China for the
next fifty to one hundred years should still be to maintain long-term socio-economic
stability and sustainable growth.  This is clearly a precondition toward establishing a
sufficient, efficient, and equitable social security system in China.
Third, international experience should be studied to avoid repeating the same
mistakes others made before.  Countries in Europe and Latin America have experimented
with different kinds of reform options to improve their pension systems. Their experiences
show that in order to get out of the lurking population aging trap, China should move
towards a system that combines two elements.  One is a fully funded and portable, defined
benefit pension plan designed to meet basic needs.  The other is occupational pension
plans or personal savings accounts to satisfy demand for maintaining or improving living
standards.
Fourth, specific action plans need to be worked out for long-term targets of
establishing a sustainable social security system.  Real economic growth can be reinforced
through improvement of the labor market; for instance by removing management rigidities,
44facilitating human resource development, strengthening competitiveness in labor markets,
reforming the household registration system, bettering the incentive structure, and
rewarding hard and innovative work.  More job  opportunities can be created in non-
traditional sectors, especially service industries which are still under-developed in China at
present, so that the unemployment rate can be lowered.  While rapid urbanization may
create some troubles, development of medium-size cities can be a feasible way to convert
some of rural population mainly engaged in agricultural activities to urban population less
dependent on land. Preserving traditional values and maintaining family-community
support -- the informal system for income security of the aged with no government and
little market involvement  -- will cushion some impact of demographic shocks. Financial
markets should be liberalized  and developed so that people can have adequate savings
instruments and insurance options, and private savings can be stimulated and put into
productive investment. With proper inflation control, workers can build up financial
assets now to pay for expenditure later.  Management of pension funds needs to be
transparent and decentralized to reduce both corruption and administrative  costs.  The
balance of pension funds should be invested efficiently to generate prudent returns.
However, many key issues need further exploration, including among others,  the
cost of switching from one pension system to another more desirable system, the
endogenous choice of a worker with options to select from different pension
arrangements, the linkage between pension systems and labor supply, and the
interdependence among savings through pension arrangements and through other
channels. The modeling technique needs improvement, for instance, in the direction of
generational accounting (see Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1985, Auerbach. Kotlikoff and
Hagemann, 1989, Boll, Raffelhuschen and Walliser, 1994). Meanwhile empirical  studies
should be extended to cover regional disparities and sectoral differences.
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